Showing posts with label Injustice. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Injustice. Show all posts

Sunday, May 16, 2010

Mungkinkah Terulang Lagi?


Sabtu, 15 Mei 2010 | 03:52 WIB
Oleh: Salahuddin Wahid (Wakil Ketua Komnas HAM 2002-2007; Pengasuh Pesantren Tebuireng)

Dua belas tahun berlalu sejak Tragedi Mei 1998, salah satu tragedi kelam yang pernah menimpa kita. Total ada 1.338 orang tewas dan 92 wanita Tionghoa mengaku diperkosa walaupun sampai hari ini masih disangkali negara.

Warga yang tidak mengalami mungkin sudah banyak yang melupakan peristiwa keji itu. Akan tetapi, bagi korban dan keluarganya hal itu akan tetap ada dalam ingatan walau ada yang bisa memaafkan. Apalagi, perjuangan keluarga korban untuk memperoleh keadilan tidak mendapat perhatian memadai dari pemerintah.

Kita pun sudah melupakan siapa yang harus bertanggung jawab dan apa penyebab timbulnya kerusuhan itu. Komnas HAM melakukan penyelidikan pro justicia kasus tersebut pada 2003 dan menyerahkan laporan ke DPR dan Kejaksaan Agung. Akan tetapi, sampai saat ini tak ada langkah tindak lanjut apa pun.

Penyelidikan Komnas HAM mengungkap fakta bahwa peristiwa itu tidak terjadi tiba-tiba dan kebetulan, melainkan dipersiapkan dengan matang oleh kekuatan yang berpengalaman dan tahu persis apa yang harus dilakukan. Pelaku di lapangan juga bukan sembarang orang, mereka terlatih dan mampu secara fisik dan mental. Tim Komnas HAM tidak mampu mengungkap siapa kekuatan di balik kerusuhan itu. Hanya Kejaksaan Agung yang bisa mengungkap lewat penyidikan.

Tak bisa disalahkan kalau banyak pihak menduga mereka yang punya pengalaman, kemampuan, dan terlatih itu terkait dengan militer, seperti oknum TNI, desertir, atau tentara bayaran (kalau ada). Namun, kita gegabah kalau menuduh oknum TNI sebagai dalang atau pelaksana kerusuhan itu tanpa bukti.


Dugaan keterlibatan

Walau sudah menduga apa jawabannya, mengikuti pikiran kritis yang agak liar, dalam sebuah diskusi tidak resmi beberapa tahun lalu saya memaksakan diri bertanya kepada seorang mayor jenderal TNI yang pada 1998 aktif di lembaga intelijen TNI. Apakah betul tidak ada oknum TNI yang terlibat dalam tragedi itu? Mengapa intelijen TNI tidak mampu mendeteksi potensi kerusuhan itu?

Mayjen tersebut tentu membantah ada oknum TNI yang terlibat, tetapi mengakui bahwa intelijen TNI dan Bakin tak mampu mendeteksi atau kecolongan. Pihak perencana dan pelaksana itu lebih unggul dibandingkan dengan lembaga intelijen dan kita tidak tahu apakah lembaga intelijen yang sekarang sudah jauh meningkat.

Lalu saya tanyakan apakah betul kesimpulan berikut: kalau tidak ada oknum atau desertir TNI yang merencanakan dan menjalankan kerusuhan itu, mungkinkah ada pihak lain yang punya kepentingan, kekuatan, dan kemampuan juga melakukan kerusuhan yang sama?

Artinya, jika suatu waktu pihak itu merasa sudah tiba saat yang tepat untuk melakukan tindakan keji (lagi) dan ada kebutuhan memaksa, maka pihak tersebut akan bisa melakukan dan pihak intelijen kita tidak mampu mendeteksi.

Sang Mayjen tidak menyetujui kesimpulan saya, tetapi jawabannya tidak meyakinkan. Maka, tidak ada salahnya saya mengangkat masalah itu kepada masyarakat. Mungkinkah kerusuhan terulang lagi pada masa depan? Apakah faktor sosial-politik- ekonomi memicu pihak pelaku kerusuhan? Apakah faktor semacam itu kini sudah tampak gejalanya? Mungkinkah kita menengarai dan mewaspadai pihak yang berpotensi melakukan?

Kita perlu mengungkap semua teka-teki itu bukan hanya mencari siapa yang bertanggung jawab, tetapi lebih kepada upaya mencegah terjadinya kembali kerusuhan keji itu. Dengan demikian, sangat layak kalau kita mendorong Kejaksaan Agung agar menyidik kasus Mei 1998 dan kasus-kasus terkait. Presiden, yang pada 2005 sudah berjanji kepada orangtua korban kasus Trisakti, perlu mendesak Kejaksaan Agung untuk menyidiknya.


Jangan kecolongan lagi

Situasi sosial-ekonomi- politik saat ini belum dianggap bisa memicu kerusuhan. Kekecewaan rakyat memang meningkat, tetapi jauh di bawah kondisi tahun 1998. Kita harus selalu mewaspadai perkembangan dan jangan sampai kecolongan lagi. Ketidakpercayaan kepada aparat penegak hukum harus ditanggapi dengan langkah nyata memperbaikinya.

Akan tetapi, kalau ada kerusuhan lagi, apakah keturunan Tionghoa kembali jadi sasaran? Amy Chua, profesor dari Yale University, mengakui ada kemungkinan cukup besar, seperti diungkapkannya dalam buku World on Fire, How Exporting Free Market Democracy Breeds Ethnic Hatred and Global Instability, 2003. Menurut dia, keturunan Tionghoa selama pemerintahan Orde Baru telah mengalami aneka kebijakan: ganti nama, larangan memakai bahasa Tionghoa, larangan merayakan Imlek, dan larangan menganut agama orang Tionghoa. Kekerasan Mei 1998 membuktikan bahwa kebijakan itu gagal.

Lebih lanjut, Amy Chua menganalisis, kelompok minoritas Tionghoa adalah kelompok market-dominant minorities yang kaya raya berkat sistem ekonomi pasar. Ini yang menimbulkan rasa iri hati dari kelompok mayoritas yang miskin. Ketidakpuasan itu ditambah kekurangmampuan dan kurangnya kapasitas kepolisian menjaga keselamatan pihak yang membutuhkan sehingga memperberat situasi.

Oleh karena itu, perlu dijalankan kebijakan ekonomi yang betul-betul memihak rakyat, khususnya di daerah perkotaan yang amat rawan dihasut dan berpotensi ikut-ikutan terlibat dalam kerusuhan. Pendekatan Pemprov DKI dan banyak kota besar lain, seperti penggusuran terhadap pedagang tradisional demi kepentingan pemodal yang umumnya kalangan Tionghoa jelas seperti menumpuk jerami kering yang mudah terbakar. Pemerintah kota besar bisa belajar dari Wali kota Solo yang bersedia berunding lebih dari 50 kali dengan pedagang untuk mencari kesepakatan merevitalisasi pasar tradisional.


Tuesday, August 11, 2009

Guilty: Aung San Suu Kyi or the Burmese Junta?

As appears on the network of Avaaz.org: The World in Action and to those that sign up for Climate 2020: Real Talks, Real Target!

It's time for the world to put the Burmese generals on trial. Avaaz is launching a call for the UN Security Council to investigate the regime for crimes against humanity -- a judgment of guilt could lead to prosecution of top generals by the International Criminal Court.

Over the next two months the UK and the US hold the powerful Presidency of the United Nations Security Council - both President Obama and Prime Minister Brown have spoken passionately about Burma, so now is our best chance in years to get the Security Council to act.

Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced today, but it's the Burmese generals who jailed her who have committed the real crimes. Join the call for justice for the Burmese people by signing the petition to put the generals on trial.


Take action now, sign the petition!

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

From Avaaz:

Dear friends,


Today, the ailing Nobel laureate and democracy icon Aung San Suu Kyi was sentenced to another year and a half in detention by a Burmese kangaroo court.

Suu Kyi's treatment is just the tip of the iceberg of the brutality of the Burmese regime -- spanning 40 years of murder, torture, mass rape, and slave labour.


It's time for the world to put the Burmese generals on trial. Avaaz is launching a call for the UN Security Council to investigate the regime for crimes against humanity -- a judgment of guilt could lead to prosecution of top generals by the International Criminal Court. Click below to join the call and see a mock up of a banner that we plan to drop in front of the UN calling for action:




Over the next two months the UK and the US hold the powerful Presidency of the United Nations Security Council - both President Obama and Prime Minister Brown have spoken passionately about Burma, so now is our best chance in years to get the Security Council to act.


But the US, UK and other Council members are still dragging their feet -- concerned about challenging China, a key sponsor of the Burmese regime. If a global outcry demands it, they will try harder to get China to agree, as happened when the Council decided to allow prosecution of another China-sponsored regime in the case of Darfur, Sudan.

Calls for investigation and prosecution of the Burmese Generals have been growing. The pressure is building on Obama and Brown as already dozens of US and British legislators have called for an inquiry. And a recent Harvard University report by top global jurists reveals that the UN has already quietly documented the forced recruitment of tens of thousands of child soldiers, more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons, numerous cases of killings and torture, mass rape and the forced displacement of 3,000 ethnic minority villages -- as many as reported in Darfur. Let's join them in this call to hold the regime to account:



The Avaaz community has stood with and supported the Burmese people through cyclone Nargis, through the massive repression of democracy activists in 2007, and this year over 400,000 of us have called for the release of political prisoners. Today, if enough of us act together, we have a chance to call upon the highest body under international law to finally end the tyranny. Sign the petition and send this on to friends and family to send a clear message to the UN Security Council that the world expects them to lead:

With hope,
Alice, Ricken, Brett, Graziela, Paula, Paul, Pascal and the whole Avaaz team.

Sources:
  • For the politics behind the guilty verdict visit: BBC News - Asia Pacific.
  • Read the Harvard report here.
  • For a United Nations Official's appeal to the Security Council visit: New York Times - Opinion.
  • See the Sudan Commission of Inquiry process here.
  • For the UK MPs call for Commission of Inquiry visit: UK Parliament.
  • For the US Senators call for a Commission of Inquiry visit here.

Want to support Avaaz? We're entirely funded by donations and receive no money from governments or corporations. Our dedicated online team ensures even the smallest contributions go a long way -- donate here.

ABOUT AVAAZ
Avaaz.org is an independent, not-for-profit global campaigning organization that works to ensure that the views and values of the world's people inform global decision-making. (Avaaz means "voice" in many languages.) Avaaz receives no money from governments or corporations, and is staffed by a global team based in Ottawa, London, Rio de Janeiro, New York, Buenos Aires, and Geneva.

Click here to learn more about our largest campaigns.

Don't forget to check out our Facebook and Myspace and Bebo pages! You can also follow Avaaz on Twitter!

To contact Avaaz, please write to us via the webform at http://www.avaaz.org/en/contact. You can also call us at +1-888-922-8229 (US) or +55 21 2509 0368 (Brazil).

Thursday, July 09, 2009

An Open Letter to Japanese Emperor and Empress

Their Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan
c/o Consulate-General of Japan in Vancouver
800-1177 West Hastings Street
Vancouver, BC
V6E 2K9

By Fax: 604-687-2236

July 9, 2009

Your Imperial Majesties the Emperor and Empress of Japan,

We are writing to you as some representatives of groups of Canadians that make up the rich diversity of this country: Japanese, Chinese, Korean, Filipino, and European. We hope you enjoyed your visit to Eastern Canada, and we would like to extend you our warm welcome to Vancouver, Canada’s gateway to the Asia-Pacific region.

With so many immigrants from all parts of Asia, we believe that Canada is an ideal place from which to promote peace and understanding among the Asia-Pacific nations. For example, Japanese-Canadians, along with people from other cultural heritages, have been working to raise awareness of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. Here in Vancouver, one of the first Article 9 groups outside of Japan raised funds to send Canadian delegates to the world’s first Global Article 9 Conference held in Chiba, Japan.

As Canadians with Asian connections, we also work together to heal the wounds of Japanese aggressions in the Asia-Pacific region before and during the Second World War, and to learn from the history of devastating wars to create a peaceful future together. For example, every year a group of Canadian educators travels to China and Korea to learn about the history of the Asia Pacific War (1931-1945), including the Nanjing Massacre and Japan’s military sex slavery system. A group of Canadian students also travels to Japan every summer to learn about the history of atomic-bombing in Hiroshima and Nagasaki, and these educators and students share their learning with the wider community when they return. Our aim is never to foster bitterness toward a specific country or group of people; instead, our goal is to create an environment for open-minded learning that transcends national borders and cultural differences.

While our educational activities have been well-received among communities in Canada, Asia and beyond, we have witnessed many non-reconciliatory responses from Japan to the global community’s efforts to help bring healing and justice to the war crime victims of this tragic chapter of history. The Japanese Parliament has yet to pass a resolution that fully admits and apologizes for Japan’s responsibility for the loss and suffering of the victims of the Asia-Pacific War, or to pass laws that stipulate compensation to those victims.

Canada is among the nations that are concerned with these issues. On November 28, 2007 the Canadian House of Commons unanimously passed a motion urging the Japanese government to take full responsibility for the involvement of the Japanese Imperial Forces in the system of forced "comfort women”, to offer a formal and sincere apology to these women, and to continue to address those who are affected in the spirit of reconciliation. Although Canada as a nation has not been perfect in addressing its own past wrongdoings, one of Canada’s achievements in this regard has been the compensation of Canadians of Japanese ancestry who were interned during the Asia-Pacific War. We would also like to see such redress offered Japanese government to the Canadian POWs captured in the Battle of Hong Kong and to the victims of China, Korea, the Philippines, and all the other countries and regions where Japan’s military committed war crimes. We would also like to see Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution remain as it is, as we and many people in Asia see Article 9 as Japan’s pledge to the world never again to engage in wars of aggression.

Your Imperial Majesties, we are aware and appreciative of how much you have demonstrated a commitment to peace and history issues. For example, your paying tribute to the Korean victims’ monument when you visited Saipan in 2005 was considered a gesture of reconciliation. When you visited China in 1992, you also expressed regret for the suffering that Japan brought to China during the Asia-Pacific War. Your words were a positive step toward healing a historical wound. Your 1993 visit to the Okinawa sites where tens of thousands of civilians died in the war was also appreciated by many people throughout Japan and beyond. We would like to appeal for your continued efforts to help bring healing and justice to the victims of atrocities committed by Japan before and during the Asia-Pacific War, and for your for support of the endeavours to keep Article 9 intact in the spirit of peace.

Thank you for your attention to our letter, and again, we would like to sincerely welcome you to Canada’s West Coast. We hope you will enjoy the beautiful sunshine, ocean and mountains of our land, and the rich and dynamic communities of our multicultural society.

Yours faithfully,

(Signed by the following organizations)


Thekla Lit
Co-chair, Canada ALPHA (Association for Learning & Preserving the History of WWII in Asia)

Satoko Norimatsu
Founding Director, Peace Philosophy Centre

Ellen Woodsworth
President, Women’s International League for Peace & Freedom, Vancouver

Tatsuo Kage
Member, Human Rights Committee of Japanese Canadian Citizens Association

Fernando P. Salanga
President, Philippine War Veterans & Ex-servicemen Society of BC

Jane Ordinario
Chairperson, Migrante-BC

Beth Dollaga
Chair, Canada-Philippines Solidarity for Human Rights

Kevin Sung,
Director, Korean Drama Club Hanuree


Some related reference materials
Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution is a clause in the National Constitution of Japan that prohibits an act of war by the state. The Constitution came into effect on May 3, 1947, immediately following World War II.


The official English translation of Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution reads:


“ARTICLE 9. Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. (2) In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized.”

Japanese war crimes occurred during the period of Asia-Pacific War (1931-1945) have also been described as an Asian Holocaust These war crimes include:-
• Mass killings
• Human experimentation and biological warfare
• Use of chemical weapons
• Preventable famine
• Torture of POWs
• Cannibalism
• Slaved labor
• Military sexual slavery system
• Looting

The Asian Holocaust is often compared to the Nazi Holocaust. The historian Chalmers Johnson, president and co-founder of the Japan Policy Research Institute, an organization promoting public education about Japan and Asia, has written that:

It may be pointless to try to establish which World War Two Axis aggressor, Germany or Japan, was the more brutal to the peoples it victimised. The Germans killed six million Jews and 20 million Russians [i.e. Soviet citizens]; the Japanese slaughtered as many as 30 million Filipinos, Malays, Vietnamese, Cambodians, Indonesians and Burmese, at least 23 million of them ethnic Chinese. Both nations looted the countries they conquered on a monumental scale, though Japan plundered more, over a longer period, than the Nazis. Both conquerors enslaved millions and exploited them as forced labourers—and, in the case of the Japanese, as [forced] prostitutes for front-line troops. If you were a Nazi prisoner of war from Britain, America, Australia, New Zealand or Canada (but not Russia) you faced a 4% chance of not surviving the war; [by comparison] the death rate for Allied POWs held by the Japanese was nearly 30%. (Chalmers Johnson, Looting of Asia, 2003)



Note: The press conference was held in the morning of July 9, 2009 to propagate the above Open Letter by multi-ethnic organizations in Canada.





Friday, May 15, 2009

Refleksi Tragedi 13-15 Mei 1998 - Kapan Ada Keadilan untuk Korban?

Para korban dan keluarganya pasti belum bisa melupakan Tragedi 13-15 Mei 1998 di Jakarta. Meski sudah 11 tahun berlalu, tragedi itu tetapmenjadi misteri yang menyisakan elegi bagi para korbannya.

Memang keberadaan negeri ini sudah lama kehilangan makna. Bagi para korban HAM, negara sudah lama absen. Ketika tragedi kelabu itu terjadi, tangisan, teriakan, dan jeritan frustrasi para korban tidak pernah didengar oleh negara, oleh pemerintah waktu itu, pemerintah yang menyusulnya kemudian sampai pemerintah di era sekarang.

Memang sudah dibentuk Komisi Nasional Hak Asasi Manusia berdasarkan UU No 39/1999 tentang HAM dan UU No 26 Tahun 2000 tentang Pengadilan HAM. Menurut Komnas HAM, telah terjadi perkosaan secara masal, sistematis, biadab, dan keji terhadap para wanita etnis Tionghoa di tengah kerusuhan 13-15 Mei 1998 di Jakarta. Pemerintah Habibie juga sudah membentuk Tim Perlindungan Wanita terhadap Kekerasan, juga ada Tim Gabungan Pencari Fakta yang dibentuk pada 23 Juli 1998. Rekomendasi kedua tim tersebut tidak pernah ditindak-lanjuti. Jadi, sampai sekarangpara pelaku Tragedi Mei itu tak satu pun yang ditangkap atau diadili.


Komnas HAM Tak Berdaya
Komnas HAM yang dulu atau sekarang telah berupaya memanggil para mantan jenderal yang dianggap mengetahui atau bertanggung-jawab atas beberapa kasus pelanggaran HAM masa lalu, tapi pemanggilan itu selalu gagal. Polemik antara para mantan jenderal dan Komnas HAM pun tak terelakkan. Semisal Menhan Juwono Sudarsono malah balik "menggugat" kewenangan hukum Komnas HAM.

Pernyataan Menhan (yang mewakili pemerintah) menunjukkan bahwa sesungguhnya komitmen pemerintah menegakkan HAM masih kecil, sementara iklim politik masih didominasi spirit anti-HAM. Padahal, pengungkapan kasus pelanggaran berat HAM yang terjadi di tanah air seperti "TragediMei 1998" memerlukan komitmen dari pemerintah. Tanpa ada komitmen dan good will langsung dari presiden, kasus tersebut bakal terkubur.

Para pelanggar HAM, apalagi dari kalangan militer, sudah bisa dipastikan akan menolak dituduh sebagai penanggung-jawab pelanggaran HAM dengan beragam argumentasi dan rasionalisasi. Mereka akan mengatakan bahwa kesalahan terletak bukan pada diri mereka.

Yang menyedihkan justru ada rasionalisasi bahwa para korban HAM dalam peristiwa 13-15 Mei 1998 itu tidak pernah ada, karena tidak pernah bisa dibuktikan. Apalagi, jika dikaitkan dengan perundang-undangan pemerkosaan di negeri ini. Bagaimana membuktikan bahwa korban sungguh diperkosa?

Seperti dikatakan advokat senior Surabaya, Trimoelja D. Soerjadi, dalam beragam kesempatan bahwa setiap kasus yang terindikasi melibatkan militer, seperti Tragedi Mei, tidak pernah akan bisa diselesaikan dengan memuaskan. Artinya, para pelaku tetap bisa menghirup udara kebebasan. Tak ada keadilan bagi para korban. Hal ini juga terjadi pada kasus pelanggaran HAM lain, mulai Peristiwa 1965 dan Tragedi Mei 1998.


Rekonsiliasi Sejati
Meski demikian, penulis menganjurkan para korban Tragedi Mei untuk berani memaafkan, meskipun memaafkan bukan berarti harus melupakan. Harus selalu dicari ruang untuk mengingat peristiwa buruk seperti Tragedi Mei 1998. Dengan demikian, usul islah atau rekonsiliasi jangan pernah diabaikan meski ada yang bertanya untuk apa rekonsiliasi.

Tentu ada beberapa hal yang perlu dilakukan agar rekonsiliasi terwujud. Pertama, harus diakui adanya pelanggaran berat HAM dalam Tragedi Mei1998. Itu berarti ada pelaku yang harus bertanggung-jawab. Kedua, keadilan harus ditegakkan. Artinya, pelaku harus mendapatkan sanksi hukum. Dengan demikian, luka hati korban dan keluarganya mendapatkan pemulihan. Setelah proses hukum ditegakkan, antara korban dan pelaku harus diupayakan perdamaian, supaya kebencian dan dendam tidak hidup terus sepanjang tujuh turunan.

Uskup Desmond Tutu, ketua Komisi Kebenaran dan Rekonsiliasi Afrika Selatan, menulis bahwa rekonsiliasi sejati mengekspos kekejaman, kekerasan, kepedihan, kebejatan, dan kebenaran, bahkan terkadang dapat memperburuk keadaan. Ini adalah perbuatan berisiko. Meski begitu, pada akhirnya akan ada pemulihan nyata setelah menyelesaikan situasi yang sebenarnya. Rekonsiliasi yang palsu hanya dapat menghasilkan pemulihan palsu (lihat buku: No Future Without Forgiveness, 1999).

Akhirnya untuk negara dan pemerintah, sekali lagi hutang-hutang pada para korban harus dilunasi. Tocqueville (1805-1859) mengingatkan: "Karena masa lalu gagal menerangi masa depan, benak manusia mengelana di tengah kabut". Kabut dari peristiwa gelap masa lalu itulah yang harus disingkap negara demi keadilan pada para korban, termasuk korban Tragedi Mei.

Selama orang terus mencari alasan guna lari dari tanggung jawab terhadap para korban HAM dan kekuasaan negara memberi perlindungan terhadap sikap pengecut ini, sehingga para pelaku terus menikmati impunitas diatas derita para korban HAM, negeri ini tetap akan susah mencapai masa depan. Sebab, pelanggaran HAM di masa silam selama terus dibiarkan justru menjadi kabut yang menghalangi perjalanan bangsa ini ke depan.

Kabut itu harus disingkap dan para korban dijamin mendapatkan keadilan yang setimpal. Dengan demikian, kita bisa menyongsong masa depan tanpa ada yang dikorbankan lagi.

Oleh: Mustofa Liem PhD, Dewan Penasihat Jaringan Tionghoa untuk Kesetaraan
Dimuat di: Jawa Pos (Rabu, 13 Mei 2009)

Sunday, January 11, 2009

Justice for Munir Said Thalib (1965-2004)


Following is a statement written by Usman Hamid (Director of KontraS in Jakarta), following the recent announcement by the Supreme Court that they have rejected the prosecutor’s appeal against the acquittal last December of Muchdi (the former Deputy Head of Intelligence who was accused of planning the murder of Human Rights Defender Munir in 2004). Usman’s statement reviews the Muchdi trial and highlights some of the procedural shortcomings during the trial.

Justice for Munir Said Thalib (1965-2004)

Summary
There is no case more central to the security of human rights defenders in Indonesia than the 2004 murder of the prominent human rights lawyer Munir. That case is now at risk of collapse. On December 31, 2008, a former senior intelligence official was acquitted on all charges following a trial marked by the systematic retraction of prior sworn statements by key witnesses, and by the presence of organized groups seeking to influence the trial. The acquittal, after 6 months under appeal to the Supreme Court, has bring a setback. The Supreme Court can't accept prosecutor's appeal.

This situation indicates:

The Indonesian justice system is not yet able to effectively prosecute senior officials with powerful connections, due to weak prosecution capacity and witness intimidation.

State bodies, in this case the State Intelligence Agency, have not sufficiently reformed and continue to threaten the security of human rights defenders.

If these conditions are to change, a successful resolution of the Munir case is essential. Such a resolution will require the full support of Indonesia 's leadership, which depends in turn on sufficient domestic and international pressure. The international community particularly the United Nations Special Procedures can play an essential part in seeking information, more progress and urging the Indonesian leadership to ensure that:

1. The Indonesian National Police continues their investigation until the case of Muchdi, and anyone else responsible for planning and ordering the murder, has been successfully resolved.

2. The Attorney General's Office assigns a professional and committed prosecution team that can submit an effective appeal of the Muchdi verdict. The AGO should also investigates the apparently coordinated retraction of prior statements by witnesses during the trial.

3. The State Intelligence Agency cooperates fully, especially by making available those witnesses who refused to appear at previous hearings, namely the agent Budi Santoso and Deputy Director As'ad Said Ali.


I. General Overview
On December 31, 2008, the South Jakarta District Court found Muchdi Purwopranjono not guilty on all charges in the murder of Munir. Muchdi, a former commander of the army's Special Forces branch and later a senior Deputy at the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), is the fourth person to be prosecuted in connection with Munir's death, but the first to be charged with planning or ordering the murder.

Munir, a leading human rights defender in Indonesia, was murdered while travelling from Jakarta to Amsterdam on September 7, 2004. So far the Indonesian court has convicted two persons: Pollycarpus, a pilot for Garuda Airlines and also an agent of the State Intelligence Agency and Indra Setiawan, former Executive Director of Garuda, a state-owned company. Both were convicted for their complicity in the murder of Munir: Pollycarpus was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment and Indra Setiawan was sentenced to one year for facilitating Pollycarpus' access to Munir on the flight; a second Garuda employee was acquitted. During these trials, Indra Setiawan testified that he met Muchdi and received a request both verbally and by a letter from the intelligence agency to assign Pollycarpus to the same flight with Munir.

The acquittal of Muchdi was a setback not only for the case, but also for the enforcement of human rights and the protection of other human rights defenders more broadly. Impunity is pervasive in Indonesia, and for such cases the justice system needs public pressure and support, domestically and internationally, to be able to work properly. Since the fall of the authoritarian Soeharto regime in 1998, no high-ranking military officer has been successfully prosecuted for a human rights abuse. Moreover, Muchdi was the first person to be tried for planning and ordering this crime. The trial was therefore a crucial step to reach the mastermind of the assassination.

On January 12 prosecutors filed their appeal of the Muchdi decision directly to the Supreme Court. That court is expected to consider the case later this year.


II. Crucial Problems

1. Police and Investigation
Although the murder investigation was initially slow to get going, under Bambang Hendarso Danuri, who has since been promoted to chief of the Indonesian National Police, the Criminal Investigation Department made a remarkable effort. New evidence was gathered and new witnesses were interrogated, including several staff members of the intelligence agency. This evidence and witness testimony were used in the trial of Pollycarpus (during the Supreme Court's case review) and of Indra Setiawan. However, there remains important evidence that the police could not obtain, such as the content of the more than 40 calls from the Pollycarpus' phone to Muchdi's phone. This raises a big question on the integrity of the Indonesian police force, since they were assisted by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation to uncover the conversation of the phone connections.

Within the CID, the police still maintain special task force for the investigation of Munir's case, as they still believe that there is another important mastermind behind the assassination. However, their investigation very much depends on the Supreme Court's decision. Questions remain about whether other high-ranking intelligence oficers, including those at the highest levels, were involved in the plot.

2. The Attorney General’s Office and the Prosecution
Although the Attorney General's Office has good relations with the victim (Suciwati) and with KASUM (the NGO coalition for the Munir case) by having regular meetings, we are quite disappointed by the prosecutor's indictment of Muchdi. First, they focused on proving Muchdi's motive for the assassination, which was very difficult in a murder involving abusive state power. Second, the prosecutor failed to bring key witnesses before the court from the intelligence service that could prove the official relationship between Pollycarpus and Muchdi. Third, they could do nothing in response to the witnesses from the intelligence service that at trial withdrew their previous sworn testimony from the investigation dossier, even though the police have confirmed that there was no torture, intimidation, or psychological pressure during the interrogations. Moreover, during the interrogation process, those witnesses were accompanied by the State Intelligence Agency's lawyer.

3. The Judiciary and the Trial
Despite the fact that his trial had several flaws, the evidence presented against Muchdi is compelling. The verdict handed down on December 31, 2008, was a controversial decision. The decision did not consider a number of aspects of the case, /inter alia/: 1) the court did not consider that the nature of a crime of conspiracy involving an intelligence agency can not be handled through the conventional method normally applied to a criminal case; and 2) the panel of judges also did not focus on the legal, formal, and substantive value of the evidence submitted in the court, including the testimony of the defendants and the witnesses who retracted their statements to the police. During the court proceedings, the panel of judges noted the difference between the prior statements and the current testimony. They warned the discrepancies would be noted in the Transcript of Proceedings (consistent with Article 163 of the Criminal Procedure Code) and reminded the witnesses of the maximum punishment if they give false testimony. However, the judges did not order the arrest of witnesses or recommend their prosecution under the laws relating to false testimony (Article 174 paragraph (1) and (2) of the Criminal Procedure Code).

The panel of judges accepted into evidence a deleted letter recovered from Muchdi's computer, from the intelligence agency to Garuda ordering Pollycarpus’ assignment to corporate security (which later enabled him to travel on Munir's flight). However the judges found that the letter could not prove that Muchdi had abused his authority. The judges also recognized the evidence that Muchdi had met Garuda's executive director, Indra Setiawan, to give him the letter, but not that it proved Muchdi's involvement in the assassination. The court also didn't take into account the previous decisions on Pollycarpus and Indra Setiawan.

The other serious problem with regard to the trial is about the telephone communication between Muchdi and Pollycarpus. The judges accepted the Call Data Record (CDR) as evidence, but found that it could not prove who was communicating and what the content of the calls was. The judges accepted the defense argument that Muchdi's telephone could have been used by someone else. However, it is hard to believe that Muchdi, a senior deputy of intelligence service, regularly allowed his mobile phone to be used by someone else.

4. Lack of Support from the President and lack of Cooperation of State Intelligence Agency
The other party who could be blame for the recent development of this case is the President himself. Soon after it was revealed that Munir died because of being poisoned, President Yudhoyono called the case as a "test of our history." However, he did not back up this statement with strong action. He created an independent fact finding team (TPF), but failed to order the State Intelligence Agency to cooperate with the team. He also didn't push BIN to make their agents and officers testify when called, including a key witness transferred to Pakistan and then Afghanistan. This failure relates to the broader lack of civilian oversight of the agency.


III. Other Problems

Muchdi mobilized several groups of thugs or militias, some of them using nationalist or religious sentiments, to intimidate Munir's supporters in the court, including Suciwati. Those groups have a violent history dealing with civil society organizations.

Following his acquittal Muchdi announced that he would file criminal defamation suits against four human rights defenders: Usman Hamid (KontraS), Suciwati (Munir's wife), Poengky (Imparsial) and Hendardi (Setara Institute), all of whom gave testimony during the trial. So far he has filed complaints to the police only about Hamid.

Usman Hamid
Director of KontraS (Committee for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence)
Executive Secretary of KASUM (Committee of Action and Solidarity for Munir)

Tuesday, April 17, 2007

The Indonesia's Way: A brand new form of discrimination against Chinese

In Indonesia, if you (in this case anybody that holds public service positions) can make things "difficult" to get money, then you'd do everything in your power to make sure your channel of "easy money" will not cease. And, the Chinese-Indonesians are those sapi perah (money-making machine), kelinci percobaan (guinea pig), kambing hitam (scapegoat), and kambing congek (one who is present but doesn't count as taking part) - depending on the situation - that are easily (and most of the times legally or politically justified) coerced to accept their "fate".

There are several positive notes on the good will to reduce discrimination but there is no penalty or punishment to enforce the regulations. Ya, itu lagi... kalau ada yang bisa dibikin susah, kenapa dibuat gampang?

Below is what we still need to fight from continuing....


Discrimination is not over for Chinese-Indonesians. Several brand new restrictions have been declared for the Chinese in the country since the end of last year.

It is now "illegal" for Chinese-Indonesians to sign a cheque or to have an insurance policy. The Civil Code and the civil litigation procedure law is no longer valid for the ethnic group. The implications are, among others, that they can not file complaints, or be complained about, in state courts for tort or breach of contract, remedies and others.

At the end of last year, The 2006 Resident Administration Law was enacted. Article 106 of the law revokes several Dutch colonial laws in the administration of resident matters, including those on the conducting of civil registration for several important events in a life of a person, i.e. birth, marriage, divorce and death. This registration has significant legal implications in areas such as inheritance rights.

The revocation of the Dutch colonial laws was a blessing because they discriminated and segregated residents into three different groups: European, Eastern Foreigner and Indigenous. Each of them was administered under different laws. Biological identification decided which law should be implied. A Caucasian with Taiwan citizenship should be registered as European and not Eastern Foreigner. That was part of the history.

The problem is, however, that the 2006 law incorrectly revokes a regulation that actually should not have been scrapped. What was revoked by article 106 C was a regulation that brought into force several laws in business for the Chinese: The Civil Code, the trade law, the bankruptcy law, the civil litigation procedure law, the firm law and the adoption law. These regulations were well known as Staatsblad 1917-129.2. Before 1917, these laws only applied to the Dutch and Europeans.

However, after these laws were accidentally revoked, they were no longer effective for the Chinese. As the Chinese play a significant role in business, it will be a "business jam". In short, it's a catastrophe.

How could this blatant discrimination happen? Has the dream of non-discriminatory treatment just evaporated?

What the 2006 law should revoke is the colonial law widely known as Staatsblad 1917-130, or the Regulation for Civil Registration for the Chinese. This regulation is stated the birth certificate of every Chinese person in Indonesia. And it is also written as the legal basis for civil registration ordinances in every regency and municipal administration. Please note that as the Staatsblad 1917-130 has not been revoked, it still is in full power to force the Chinese into a different registration scheme. And that is discrimination, at least segregation.

The case is just the same for article 106 E that revokes Staatsblad 193-74, a regulation on marriage for Christian Indonesians in Java, Minahasa and Ambon. This Staatsblad had already been revoked by Article 66 of the 1974 Marriage Law.

What the 2006 law should revoke is known as Staatsblad 1933-75, or the Regulation for Civil Registration for Christian Indonesians. Again, just like Chinese, this regulation is stated on the birth certificate for every Christian Indonesian and used by every regency government. Still, it has been wrongly typed.

Suppose this flaw was not a result of negligence. The lack of proficiency in the Dutch language could be the primary cause, as the colonial era is long over.

On the other hand, should those who drafted the law on resident administration have intentionally formulated the law as it is now, then it is a disaster for our nation and character building. It is a reconnaissance of minority groups. The present careless regime theoretically has full power to continue discrimination.

Carelessly or intentionally, the Home Ministry must be responsible at least for an immediate revision for the law.

By: Ivan Wibowo, Jakarta
The writer is a member of the Advocate-Youth Chinese Network. He can be reached at ivanwibowo@gmail.com


Friday, January 26, 2007

Poso on the Edge

I read this news from ICG (International Crisis Group) on Poso. The conflict that started in 2000 (a year after similar conflict erupted in Ambon) doesn't seem to end. Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus da Silva and Marinus Riwu accused of masterminding the 2000 riot between Muslims and Christians in Indonesia were executed by firing squad at an undisclosed location in the island nation’s Central Sulawesi province September 22, The Jakarta Post reported. And, yet, the vicious circle of violence has not stopped with the death penalty execution of these three men. It is strange in a small city where everybody knows each other and the concentration of policemen and army has been so heavy after the prolonged violent conflict can't bring the "real" perpetrator to the court.

My friend Ulla, who experienced the impact of the third Poso incident said that nobody seemed to anticipate that the violent incident would come their way - since the community bonding was so tight and close. It's sad that there is some power behind this never-ending conflict that has taken so many lives and has robbed the peaceful future of its local people.


INTERNATIONAL CRISIS GROUP - NEW REPORT
Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge


Jakarta/Brussels, 24 January 2007: Recent police raids in Poso with high casualties may have just given Indonesia’s weakened jihadi movement a new boost.

Jihadism in Indonesia: Poso on the Edge,* the latest report from the International Crisis Group, follows the 22 January police action in the Central Sulawesi city that left sixteen people dead, including one policeman. The paper examines how a neighbourhood in Poso became a stronghold of the terrorist organisation, Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), and how a small group of men managed to terrorise the city for three years before their identities became known. The government’s new determination to crack down on violent jihadi networks in Poso is welcome, but Poso must not become the new cause celebre for the country’s mujahidin.

“There were already indications that the suspects and their sympathisers were portraying police operations as a fight against thoghut – anti-Islamic forces – in an effort to enlist other mujahidin from outside their own group”, says Sidney Jones, Crisis Group’s South East Asia Project Director. “From Monday’s raid alone, they now have at least fifteen men they will almost certainly claim as martyrs”.

Just after dawn on 22 January, Indonesian police moved in on a quiet residential street in Poso to arrest a group of men, most of them local members of JI wanted for a range of bombings, beheadings, and drive-by shootings. At the end of the day, one policeman and fifteen others – most but not all of them mujahidin – were dead, and several more on both sides wounded. Some two dozen men were arrested as they tried to flee, and police operations are continuing.

These events, following eight months of efforts to persuade the suspects to surrender and a similar but less lethal 11 January raid, suggest several new risks. One is that jihadis will try to take the anti-thoghut war beyond Poso, targeting police elsewhere. Another danger is that the JI faction that considers bombings of Western targets wrong and Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist and the man believed to be behind some of Indonesia’s deadliest bombings, a deviant, will see this jihad as legitimate. Finally, it is possible some of the fugitives might try to join forces with Noordin in Java.

The Indonesian government should step back and look at how to address the broader causes of ongoing violence in Poso. The government needs to set up an independent fact-finding body composed of civilian officials, military, police, NGOs and religious leaders to examine grievances left over from Poso’s communal conflict that reached its height in 2000-2001. It should also set up a body to document the needs of those still displaced and work out an employment program to absorb the local mujahidin.

“The long-running jihad in Poso has changed, it seems, from revenge attacks against local Christians to a war against the police”, says Robert Templer, Director of Crisis Group’s Asia Program. “Even if the remaining suspects are arrested, no one should be complacent that the violence in Poso is over.”

Just after dawn on 22 January, Indonesian police moved in on a quiet residential street in Poso to arrest a group of men, most of them local members of JI wanted for a range of bombings, beheadings, and drive-by shootings. At the end of the day, one policeman and fifteen others – most but not all of them mujahidin – were dead, and several more on both sides wounded. Some two dozen men were arrested as they tried to flee, and police operations are continuing.

These events, following eight months of efforts to persuade the suspects to surrender and a similar but less lethal 11 January raid, suggest several new risks. One is that jihadis will try to take the anti-thoghut war beyond Poso, targeting police elsewhere. Another danger is that the JI faction that considers bombings of Western targets wrong and Noordin Mohammed Top, South East Asia’s most wanted terrorist and the man believed to be behind some of Indonesia’s deadliest bombings, a deviant, will see this jihad as legitimate. Finally, it is possible some of the fugitives might try to join forces with Noordin in Java.

The Indonesian government should step back and look at how to address the broader causes of ongoing violence in Poso. The government needs to set up an independent fact-finding body composed of civilian officials, military, police, NGOs and religious leaders to examine grievances left over from Poso’s communal conflict that reached its height in 2000-2001. It should also set up a body to document the needs of those still displaced and work out an employment program to absorb the local mujahidin.

“The long-running jihad in Poso has changed, it seems, from revenge attacks against local Christians to a war against the police”, says Robert Templer, Director of Crisis Group’s Asia Program. “Even if the remaining suspects are arrested, no one should be complacent that the violence in Poso is over”.

Contacts:
Andrew Stroehlein (Brussels) 32 (0) 2 541 1635
Kimberly Abbott (Washington) 1 202 785 1601
To contact Crisis Group media please click here

*Read the full Crisis Group report on our website: http://www.crisisgroup.org

The International Crisis Group (Crisis Group) is an independent, non-profit, non-governmental organisation covering over 50 crisis-affected countries and territories across four continents, working through field-based analysis and high-level advocacy to prevent and resolve deadly conflict.

Other links on Poso:
Post-conflict Poso: Consumed by hate, divided by faith from The Jakarta Post

Friday, January 19, 2007

Our Story on Munir will be Aired...

That's the title on NS' e-mail to a group of people that support and have made this thing happen. Here is the detail of this good news:

Dear friends and colleagues,
I am very happy to announce that The Global Village radio report on Munir that so many of us worked on will be aired next week on CBC (the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation).

The first show will be aired on CBC Radio One on January 25 at 8pm EST, and the second on CBC Radio Two on January 27at 6:30pm EST. For those of you in Indonesia, it can be heard on the internet at
http://www.cbc.ca/globalvillage/ on January 26 at 8am and January 28 at 6:30am (I believe that you're ahead of Eastern Standard Time by 12 hours). It is a very short piece (just 3 minutes or so), but I hope that it captures the main messages of the campaign for justice being led by Suciwati, Kontras, Imparsial and so many other human rights activists and organizations. The report includes parts of my interview with Suciwati and with Endah Widiastuti, a young musician based in Jakarta. As you all know, The Global Village programme on CBC features "news through music", so the songs written in tribute to Munir by Endah and other Indonesian musicians (Iwan Fals and Segorames) will be played during the report. The solidarity of these and other artists is highlighted in this piece.

Thanks again to all of you who made this radio report possible. A special thanks to Suciwati, Usman, Rusdi, Mufti, Endah, Elisabeth and all the friends and family who worked hard behind the scenes to help make this happen.

With warm regards,
NS


... I'm glad, very glad indeed that this radio report on Munir will be aired on Canadian national radio (CBC) next week *smile*. While NS here there were a lot of people would go the extra mile to help her just so she could make it to the interviews, took the "ambience" during the Munir's Memorial gathering around HI, or converted the audio piece to the USB. Dear friend, we made it! Of course we have decided to donate the honorarium the CBC has paid us to do this report to help cover the costs of Suciwati and Usman's lobbying and advocacy visit to Canada. This will be a CCEVI contribution towards this important visit.

When I told one of my friends why I was so busy during that time and always re-scheduled our meeting... she later asked, "I'm concerned about it too. I wish I could join you. And, why did you do it?" I said, "Munir had done a great thing for us, for Indonesia... it's a pity if I was given the opportunity and I didn't do anything. Don't you think so?"

Like Mother Teresa said... do small thing with great love and care. Well, it's just my small contribution to the country that I love-to-hate and hate-to-love, like a drop in the ocean... Imagine lots of drops and we could make a huge wave *smile*.

Thank you, NS, for your admirable spirit!

Thursday, January 18, 2007

AHRC: Indonesia's Human Rights Report 2006

Asian Human Rights Commission (AHRC)
19/F, Go-Up Commercial Building,

998 Canton Road, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China


INDONESIA: The Human Rights Situation in 2006
Asia has hardly been the poster-child for Human Rights; in fact, its track-record of human rights violations has grown progressively worse over recent years. Indonesia is no exception. Government conspiracies and corruption, police brutality, judicial apathy, civil unrest and state-sanctioned torture have become a routine reality in In this report, we will highlight and explore in-depth some of the key fundamental issues that underlie the current crisis in Indonesia. By examining recent events in the broader context of this institutional crisis, which is holding the country in deadlock, we can begin to make some leeway in understanding the magnitude of the problem at hand, and what can and must be done to rectify it.



MURDER OF A MARTYR: Recent developments in the Munir Murder Case
The assassination of renowned Indonesian human rights defender, Mr. Munir Said Thalib, and the subsequent highly dubious investigations and paper-thin prosecution offers an opportune analytical starting-point in gauging the current climate of State politics and stability in Indonesia.

The theatrical court prosecution of the case came to a dramatic conclusion, when on October 3, 2006, the Panel of Judges of the Supreme Court in Jakarta returned with a verdict of ‘Not Guilty’ in the criminal case against prime suspect, Garuda Airways Pilot Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto on the charge of premeditated murder. Mr. Pollycarpus was however found guilty of falsifying the Garuda Airways work roster, and was sentenced to two years imprisonment.

Although hardly surprising, considering the high political stakes involved in the said criminal trial, the Supreme Court’s ruling blatantly overlooked the findings of an evaluational examination conducted by the Central Jakarta District Court and the Jakarta High Court between the 20th - 23rd May 2006, which exposed the shoddy standards of application of domestic legislation and judicial procedure in the criminal investigations into Mr. Munir’s murder.

The examination findings also made direct reference to a letter signed by primary witnesses, Ramelgia Anwar (Vice Corporate of Security for Garuda Airways) and Indra Setiawan (Director of Garuda Airways), instructing Mr. Pollycarpus to travel aboard the 974 flight to Amsterdam, in which Mr. Munir would be travelling. Additionally, it was found that Mr. Pollycarpus had been in almost constant contact with Major-General Muchdi PR (Deputy of the Badan Intelijen Negera (BIN), a State Intelligence Body) prior to travelling aboard the said flight. Records show that Mr. Pollycarpus made over 41 calls to Mr. Muchdi’s mobile phone, his home telephone, as well as at his office at BIN. Despite the documenting of what is undoubtedly damning evidence of a complex and carefully politically-orchestrated conspiracy, the Attorney General and the National Police have shown no intention to conduct further investigative inquiries in light of these findings.

The Supreme Court’s ruling was met with moral outrage by the late Mr. Munir’s grieving family, colleagues and far-reaching support base. The Committee on Solidarity for Munir, by far the most vocal of political pressure groups in Indonesia, held a press conference on October 5, 2006, in which they openly challenged the competency of the Indonesian judiciary, police and parliament.

Mr. Munir’s family and supporters, who continue to be subjected to threats, intimidation and extreme harassment by police and political agents alike, recently filed a 13 billion Rupiah (US$1.4 million dollar) lawsuit against Garuda Airways for the death of Mr. Munir.

In a very recent development, Mr. Munir’s widow, Mrs. Suciwati, met with Mr. Philip Alston, UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary, or Arbitrary Executions in, appealing that he lead an official UN intervention and investigative inquiry into Mr. Munir’s murder. This was met with outright indignation by Indonesian political and police authorities alike.

Chief of National Police, General Sutanto, vehemently stated that he would under no circumstances allow international (particularly UN) involvement in police investigations; “This is our sovereignty…we want no foreigners interfering in the process”, but added that international assistance in the form of technical support (e.g.: loaning their DNA testing services) was preferred.

Defense Minister, Dr. Juwono Sudarsono also stated that while the genuine concern, interest and sincere advice of foreign governments and international humanitarian bodies was welcome, “...We don’t need international intervention…our own legal systems can handle this”. It is not clear whether this decision could effectively mean that Mr. Alston will be denied entry to Indonesia.

Such a move by the Indonesian Government in the face of mounting international pressure following Mr. Pollycarpus Priyanto’s acquittal could seriously undermine the credibility of the Indonesian State, notably with regard to its membership in the UN Human Rights Council.


DIAGNOSING THE DISEASE: Breaking down the problem of Indonesia’s institutional failure
Mr. Munir’s murder and the subsequent series of events offer a telling insight into the desperate situation in which the fundamental principles of justice and human rights finds themselves in Indonesia. If this is “justice” for one of Indonesia’s most prominent public citizens, one can only imagine what is available to ordinary Indonesian citizens. The AHRC is of the view that the rule of law is fundamental to the maintenance of a stable society and the fundamental principles of human rights within that society, and that the current and prevailing predicament that has long characterized the highly volatile Asian region can be traced to the near total collapse of the rule of law in many Asian nations.

In the case of Indonesia, we will present this predicament issue by issue, as follows:

International Convention vs. Domestic Legislation
The overarching obstacle to any form of rule of law in Indonesia, and indeed in wider Asia, is the ever-expanding vacuum between the norms and standards embodied in international conventions, and those put into practice at the domestic legislative level. A recently elected member to the UN Human Rights Council in May of 2006, and a State party to the UN Convention against Torture (CAT), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESR), Indonesia has often been accused of paying lip service to international institutions and bodies of authority (namely the UN), while simultaneously and systematically failing to fulfil its fundamental obligations to its people.

According to the European Court of Human Rights, the CAT convention is a “living instrument which must be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions”; it is here where the underlying root-cause of the problem lies. A major point of contention and heated debate concerns the failure of the Indonesian government to accommodate the fundamental principles of the CAT in domestic legislation, and the establishment of a systematic mechanism through which these principles may be translated into practice - eight years after having ratified the said convention.

Despite its three primary courts of law: the Court of General Jurisdiction; the Military Court; and the more recently established Human Rights Court, the pursuit of justice still remains a distant prospect for many Indonesians.

The existing Indonesian Penal Code (KUHP) and the Law of Criminal Procedure (KUHAP) does not explicitly employ the term ‘torture’ in its legislative literature, instead opting for the much milder term ‘maltreatment’. However close in definition, ‘maltreatment’ does not equate to torture before a court of law, and therefore cannot be prosecuted as such. More importantly, it does not take into consideration human rights violations committed by State-agents; a key qualitative aspect of the international definition of torture under the CAT. The UN Committee against Torture stated on this matter that: “The special nature of torture would be masked by classing torture together with traditional terms such as mistreatment or abuse of authority. And while torture is certainly covered, to a large extent, by national terms, there is one important difference. A substantial characteristic of torture is that the actions are performed by the State. Bringing torture under the traditional national and provisions would damage an important qualitative and distinguishing aspect of torture”.

The core cause of the current crisis of the rule of law in Indonesia, particularly with regard to torture and other human rights violations, is that the existing laws in Indonesia are not self-executing. They remain abstract concepts on paper, unfulfilled in practice. The responsibility for this largely lies in the hands of Indonesia’s collapsed prosecution system.

Much hope was pinned on the establishment of the Human Rights Court in 2000, initially established - largely due to international pressure - to address the atrocious record of human rights violations committed by the Indonesian government and military in the build-up to East Timor’s independence in 1999.

Seven years on, and all hopes have faded. What was once seen as a monumental step forward has actually proved itself to be two steps back. The definition of a human rights violation according to the Human Rights Court has been stretched so tight, that its current criteria for deciding the eligibility of a case for prosecution is based solely on the fact of whether it is part of an organized and systematic project of mass genocide. As a result, the vast majority of cases of torture and other human rights violations committed by State-agents in Indonesia which do not occur under genocidal circumstances, go unprosecuted and unpunished.

The Military Court has been suggested by some to bear the disturbing characteristics of the highly despotic culture of the New Order Regime, which was overturned in 1998. By virtue of Article 9[a] of Law 31/1997, any military officer charged with a criminal offense has the right to demand to be tried by a military court, which consists of their superiors. The process of prosecution within a military court is a behind-closed-doors affair, and often overrides any and all decisions made by either the Court of General Jurisdiction or the Human Rights Court.

The status of the military in Indonesia could be said to be that of a dictatorship. It has become somewhat of an acknowledged fact of the Indonesian brand of “justice”, that military officers and personnel are able to skirt around the law, and evade any accountability whatsoever for their actions before courts of law, even going so far as to point-blank refuse to cooperate with investigations. In fact, public fear of the military in Indonesia is so great that they very openly intimidate, bribe, blackmail, harass and threaten (often with death) the victims and their families, trial witnesses, independent investigators, human rights activists, and even the prosecution and judges themselves. It is a well known fact that many public prosecutors are highly reluctant to take on criminal cases involving military officers or personnel, and it has been known for prosecutors to deliberately lose their cases for fear of the repercussions of a victory against Indonesia’s ever-powerful military.

Despite the recent passing of a Witness and Victims’ Protection Bill by the Indonesian parliament, it will be another year (possibly longer) before the law is officiated and put into practice. However, human rights activists and organizations have expressed their concern over the content of this new law, which prescribes that a person’s eligibility for witness/victim protection will be assessed and decided by a State-appointed commissioner. This is a clear violation of the obligations of the Indonesian government under the ICCPR, which identifies equal access to witness/victim protection as a fundamental civil and political right. At present, the lack of an established system of protection and support has left victims and trial witnesses vulnerable to intimidation, harassment, and even violence.

Therefore, given the circumstances, it is hardly surprising that many succumb to accepting bribes, or choose to settle their cases out of the courtroom as opposed to gambling on the evidently collapsed and completely ineffective system of law and order in Indonesia.


Police Torture: An Epidemic out of Control
Torture is at the top of Indonesia’s lengthy record of human rights violations, and is fast becoming an epidemic. Ironically enough, it is the law-enforcement authorities who more often than not are responsible for the violation of the very laws and principles\n that they have been assigned to protect.

The collapse of the rule of law in Indonesia can be directly traced to the collapse of the police as a legitimate law-enforcement authority. The relatively recent separation of the police from under the authority of the military has meant that for the first time, police officers could be held accountable before the Court of General Jurisdiction. This was Criminal Procedure Code was speedily amended to prohibit the prosecution of any criminal case that has not been subject to an official police investigation and inquiry, including in prosecution cases against police officers themselves. The implications of this amendment effectively mean that the police are able to block, stall and even discontinue any and all investigative inquiries and disciplinary actions made against their officers. The realities of this are that the police and the military in Indonesia currently enjoy privileges of power that even the Government are not privy to. In fact, one could even argue that their level of power is gradually resembling that of a dictatorship, much in the style of former President and despot, General Suharto. Despite their functioning independently from each other, the police nevertheless continue to employ highly militaristic methods of discipline, whilst the military continue to play a significant role in the maintenance and enforcement of public law and order.


Case Study: Mr. Yupiter Manek
Mr. Yupiter Manek was arrested and kept in detention by officers of the Belu Resort Police on December 18, 2005 on charges of sexual harassment of a young female employee of a local department store. Mr. Manek was subsequently tortured by Belu Police officers, and on December 23, 2005, slipped into a coma. After having been admitted to the nearest hospital, and with his family at his bedside, Mr. Manek succumbed to his injuries at 12:30 pm on the same day.

According to members of his family, Mr. Manek’s body was severely bruised and swollen, and inside his trouser pocket, they found a cigarette pack on which was written, “Uncle, Father, Mother, Minggus, Eta, Jum, Igung, (I) was butchered by the Belu Resort Police”. When confronted with this, the Deputy Officer in Charge (OIC) of the Belu Police Headquarters denied any responsibility concerning Mr. Manek’s death, instead alleging that Mr. Manek was a drug addict, and fell in the bathroom, where he sustained a head injury which induced his coma.

The Belu Police authorities pressured Mr. Manek’s family into signing binding documents agreeing not to sue the Belu Police for Mr. Manek’s death, and also not to press for a post-mortem examination of Mr. Manek. Mr. Manek’s family later appealed to the East Nusa Tenggara Provincial Police to revoke these documents, and requested a formal investigative inquiry into Mr. Manek’s death.

On the February 2, 2006, the Chief of the Belu Resort Police passed a disciplinary sentence on four police officers allegedly responsible for Mr. Manek’s torture. Officer Muhammad Ramlah - believed to be the “ringleader” in this incident - was sentenced to 21 days imprisonment, while the three other officers were sentenced to 14 days imprisonment. It is important to make mention here, that these disciplinary sentences were made on the basis of “maltreatment” charges, as opposed to torture and indeed murder. Having completed their sentences, the said officers were reinstated in their prior positions, and have not been prosecuted any further.


Case Study: Mr. Marino
Mr. Marino, a 38 year old farmer, was brutally gunned down by officers of the Sukoharjo Mobile Police Unit on October 20, 2006, at his parents-in-law's home in Central Java. On the date of the said incident, brigadiers Sutrisno, Mulyono and Tupono were conducting raids on well-known local gambling haunts, when they spotted Mr. Marino transporting a diesel machine (which he used to irrigate his farm) by bicycle with his brother Widodo.

A local farmer and resident of the Muningan Village in the Sukoharjo district, Mr. Marino had been irrigating his farm and was travelling to his parents-in-law's home. The officers in question, for reasons still unexplained, pursued Mr. Marino and his brother, following them to the his parents-in-law's home. There, the officers accused Mr. Marino of being involved in the local underground gambling scene; charges which Mr. Marino vehemently denied. Brigadier officer Sutrisno then fired a warning shot into the air, before shooting Mr. Marino. Mr. Marino was rushed to the nearest hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries a few hours later. To date, no prosecutory action has been taken against the said officers.

These two cases are merely the tip of the iceberg of Indonesia’s record of human rights abuses committed by the police. The police are crucial intermediaries between the State and its people. Therefore, the collapse of the police as a legitimate source of law, order and social morality carries both micro- and macro-level repercussions for the stability of society itself.

Torture has become endemic in the existing system of law-enforcement in Indonesia and is the police’s “trump-card”. Cases of torture of criminal suspects, detainees, witnesses, the homeless and innocent persons hardly raise an eyebrow amongst the local masses, who have long grown accustomed to the Indonesian “method” of policing.


Indonesia’s most unconventional methods of detention of criminal suspects have come under heavy criticism from the local and international humanitarian community. Contrary to international standards, the police in Indonesia are able to detain a suspect for an extendable period of 20 days, and additionally, are under no obligation to produce the suspect before a Magistrate. If the suspect is sentenced to imprisonment of under nine years, the police can upon issuing a formal appeal to the Magistrate, detain the suspect for an additional period of 60 days, and 120 days if the suspect is sentenced to more than nine years imprisonment.

The unwarranted accusation and subsequent killing of innocent civilians by police officers who are willing to name and shame a person whom they know to be innocent for the sake of concluding an investigation, has also become part-and-parcel of system of law and order.

One of the most difficult tasks that any judicial system will inevitably be confronted with is the issue of ensuring that State institutions, agencies and actors are not immune to the very laws which they have been assigned to enforce and protect; a task at which Indonesia is failing miserably. Excusing State-actors of accountability seriously undermines public faith in the justice system and in the very legitimacy of the State itself. The existing system of law and order in Indonesia has created a “trickle-down” culture of corruption, chaos and social anarchy. By indulging in such reckless, lawless and brutish behaviour, officers of the police and the State are setting a poor example for citizens to follow. This begs the crucial question: if the State cannot adhere to the rule of law, how can one then expect citizens to?


Right to Redress: A fundamental, yet systematically denied right for many Indonesians
The question of torture is inevitably tied to the question of redress for the unfortunate victims of torture. Under the CAT, the right to redress for victims of torture is clearly enshrined as a fundamental right. It also clearly identifies redress as the sole responsibility of the State and State-systems. Yet again, the Indonesian Government has failed to deliver on this issue.

The problem of the lack of redress for victims of torture and other human rights abuses in Indonesia results from poor State mechanisms for processing, investigating and prosecuting human rights abuse cases. Particularly in cases involving police or military officers, any and all official complaints filed by either the victims or their families more often than not are stalled indefinitely, and rarely reach the courts. Intimidation of victims, witnesses and their families into withdrawing their complaints currently accompanies many, if not all human rights abuse cases in Indonesia.


Case Study: Mr. Rudi Sebastian
On August 16, 2006, Mr. Sebastian was arrested by officers of the Garut Attorney General Office and detained at the Garut Correctional Institution in the Garut district of West Java, where he was tortured by four correctional officers. Mr. Sebastian was at no point informed of the charges under which he was being arrested or detained. Mr. Sebastian suffered severe bodily bruising and injuries; sustaining two broken fingers, swelling of the eyes, hands and legs and was unable to walk. The next day, when Mr. Sebastian’s wife - Mrs. Imas Tini - visited him at the correctional institution, he identified his torturers as Ahmad Syarif, Nana, Catur and Oki. On August 22, 2006, Mrs. Imas Tini filed a formal complaint against the accused officers, but was threatened by the Chief of the Garut Correctional Institution, who allegedly said; “You could complain to the police. But we cannot guarantee Rudi’s life”. Undeterred, Mrs. Tini filed a formal complaint with the Resort Police of Garut. To date, despite a formal complaint, there has been no official investigation into Mr. Sebastian’s case.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill is a clear example of the insincerity of the Indonesian State in fulfilling its obligations under the CAT to grant its citizens equal access to avenues of redress in the event of the violation of their human rights. Established in 2004, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill is widely condemned as the State’s attempt to whitewash its deplorable record of human rights-related crimes during the 1965-66 massacres. The Bill states that the victim’s forgiveness of their perpetrators is a mandatory condition for claiming State compensation for their physical and psychological grievances. By doing so, the victims are effectively sealing their perpetrators’ immunity from prosecution. Despite it being widely condemned by both local and international humanitarian organizations, activists and actors, the Indonesian government has made no amendments to the Bill.

Also at issue here, is the right of the victims (and their families) to be informed of the court verdict. At the present moment, under Indonesia’s judicial legislation, the official verdict passed by the court judge is made known only to the prosecutor and the defendant. In many prosecution cases, the victim has often learnt of the outcome of their case at the same time as the public.


Marginalization of the Minorities: A Recipe for Disaster
The UN Declaration on the Rights of Persons belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities and the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief clearly identify a person’s right to practice their chosen form of religion without fear of reprisal and discrimination, as well as the right of minorities in any given society to participation and representation within the State's democratic process. As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the Indonesian government should incorporate these fundamental principles in its domestic legislation, and set up mechanisms to oversee the fulfillment of these rights for all its citizens. Although the Indonesian Constitution does acknowledge the rights of its citizens to their freedom to practice their chosen form of religion without fear of persecution, the realities on the ground show a very different picture.

Indonesia’s Muslim community comprises over 86% of the total population and enjoy the privileges of power commonly associated with a majority, whilst Islamic norms and values have primacy in Indonesian society. Currently, the Indonesian State only recognizes six major religions: Islam, Christianity, Catholicism, Buddhism, Hinduism and Confucianism. This sidelines the numerous other religious groups that exist in Indonesia. As a result, these groups and their members are marginalised, greatly narrowing the scope of their participation in public life.

Those wishing to marry in Indonesia must first complete a registration form which requires that the couple specify their religion. Those from minority religious groups that are not recognized by the Indonesian government must in many cases list themselves as Muslim and marry according to Islamic custom.


Islamized politics and political parties have seen a steady rise in recent years, and have undoubtedly impacted intra-religious affairs in Indonesia. In 1961, the government, which is heavily backed by Islamic political parties, made a public declaration in which they accused the Ahmadiyyahs, an Islamic minority group, of being heretics and “non- Muslims”. Their spreading of anti-Ahmadiyyah sentiments across the cross-section of orthodox Muslims is believed to have incited a spate of attacks against members of the Ahmadiyyah minority.


Case Study: Attacks on Ahmadiyyahs
Three houses owned by Ahmadiyyahs were attacked and vandalized by frenzied mobs of up to 100 people, and one Ahmaddiyyah follower sustained minor facial injuries in a religiously motivated attack in the Ketapang Village of West Lombok on October 19, 2005.

This was one of a series of intimidation attempts by the local orthodox Muslim community to drive the three resident Ahmadiyyah families out of the village before the commencement of Ramadan, the most important occasion in the Islamic calendar. In a similar act of religious hatred, a 400-strong mob of villagers attacked, vandalized and plundered a local Ahmadiyyah mosque, over 23 houses owned by Ahmadiyyah followers (11 of which were irreparably damaged), and 1 car owned by an Ahmadiyyah follower in the rural village of Cicakra in the Cianjur region of West Java on September 20, 2005. Arguably the most extensive attack against Ahmadiyyahs, took place on the 9th and 15th of July 2005, when a mob numbering in their thousands attacked an Ahmadiyyah settlement, torching it to the ground.

Similar attacks on Ahmadiyyah-owned property, including mosques, homes, schools, shops and vehicles, have been reported across Indonesia, from Kalimantan to Lombok. Alongside the problem of the attacks themselves, is the apathy and inactivity on the part of the Indonesian government and the police to protect the Ahmadiyyah community and

This was one of a series of intimidation attempts by the local orthodox Muslim community to drive the three resident Ahmadiyyah families out of the village before the commencement of Ramadan, the most important occasion in the Islamic calendar. In a similar act of religious hatred, a 400-strong mob of villagers attacked, vandalized and plundered a local Ahmadiyyah mosque, over 23 houses owned by Ahmadiyyah followers (11 of which were irreparably damaged), and 1 car owned by an Ahmadiyyah follower in the rural village of Cicakra in the Cianjur region of West Java on September 20, 2005. Arguably the most extensive attack against Ahmadiyyahs, took place on the 9th and 15th of July 2005, when a mob numbering in their thousands attacked an Ahmadiyyah settlement, torching it to the ground.

Similar attacks on Ahmadiyyah-owned property, including mosques, homes, schools, shops and vehicles, have been reported across Indonesia, from Kalimantan to Lombok. Alongside the problem of the attacks themselves, is the apathy and inactivity on the part of the Indonesian government and the police to protect the Ahmadiyyah community and other vulnerable minorities, and to prevent such attacks in the future. To date, the police have taken no action in conducting official investigations into any of the reported cases of discriminatory attacks against the Ahmadiyyah community, nor have they taken any prosecutory action against those persons involved in the attacks. This shows the complete failure on the part of the Indonesian State to protect its citizens, which is one of its most fundamental obligations.



Case Study: The Execution of three Catholic prisoners in Poso
Fabianus Tibo, Dominggus Da Silva and Don Marinus Riwu were executed by firing squad at an undisclosed location near Palu Mutiara Airport in the Poso region of Centra Sulawesi Province on September 22, 2006. Having been convicted in 2001 on charges of inciting a mass communal riot in Poso in 2000, which left over 200 Muslims dead (charges which the three prisoners vehemently denied up until the day of their death), local and international humanitarians and political commentators believe that their execution was driven by a heavily political agenda, in order to placate the agitated Muslim majority.

Having been postponed several times due to mounting international pressure, a final decision on the execution date was set following a meeting between Indonesian President Mr. Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, and Central Sulawesi Police authorities. Despite the uncovering of substantial evidence confirming the prisoners’ innocence, the Supreme Court rejected appeals for a judicial review of the criminal case on the basis of the fact that under the Indonesian Constitution, a criminal case may only be reviewed once. During the process of their prosecutory trial, witnesses who could support the innocence of the defendants were barred from testifying before the Supreme Court. President Yudhoyono rejected the prisoners’ joint appeal for clemency twice - in November 2005 and later in May 2006.


Lessons that need to be Learnt: The way forward for Indonesia
In conclusion, the AHRC recommends that the Indonesian authorities implement the following recommendations:

1) The Indonesian government must undertake immediate reform to ensure consistency between international norms, standards and procedures and those followed at the domestic level. As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, and as a State-party to the CAT, ICCPR and ICESCR and other such UN conventions, the Indonesian government is bound by obligation to protect, maintain and enforce the fundamental human rights enshrined in these instruments. This can only be achieved by developing domestic legislation that directly corresponds with international human rights laws and standards to which the country is party.

With regard to the rule of law, the key lies with the existing domestic Penal Code (KUHAP) in Indonesia. The AHRC recommends that the Indonesian government make immediate amendments to the existing Penal Code. A key point of reform is the current domestic definition of torture that does not differentiate between torture and maltreatment between undermines a fundamental qualitative aspect of the CAT with regard to torture; that it is a gross human rights violation of the highest order, committed by officers of the State. Therefore, the Indonesian government urgently needs to revise its definition of torture to directly correspond with that stipulated in the CAT. The government must introduce mechanisms under which cases of torture can be speedily and effectively reported, investigated and prosecuted.

In addition, the existing draft of the Witness and Victim’s Protection Bill must urgently be revised to provide witness/victim protection to all persons who require it. The existing Bill which prescribes that a person’s eligibility for witness/victim protection must be decided by a State-appointed commissioner is in clear violation of the ICCPR, to which the Indonesia is a State-party. Under the ICCPR, equal access to witness/victim protection is clearly identified as a fundamental civil and political right.


2) The unbridled power of the military and the police in Indonesia is a serious cause for concern. It is evident from the case studies included in this report, that the crisis of the rule of law is inextricably linked to the collapse of the police and other institutions of the rule of law as legitimate law-enforcement authorities and sources of communal morality. There can be no rule of law in Indonesia, or indeed anywhere, when officers of the State routinely abuse and remain immune to the very laws that they have been appointed to enforce and protect. By taking prosecutory action against those police and military officers who have demonstrated a total disregard and indifference to the rule of law through their human rights violations, the Indonesian government will be sending a clear message to both its citizens and its officers alike: let no-one be immune before the law.

A transparent system of justice is crucial to reaffirming the legitimacy of any State. This is a critical requirement for the Indonesian State. The current use of military courts and the pattern of selectively adhering to domestic judicial legislation and procedures is a clear step in the wrong direction. Therefore, the AHRC strongly recommends that the Indonesian government review this matter, and clip the wings of the military by making it mandatory that criminal cases in which military officers have been charged with abuses against civilians be tried in the Court of General Jurisdiction. Moreover, the Indonesian government should take appropriate disciplinary action against military officers who refuse to comply with the State authorities and judicial procedures and official investigations.


3) The right to redress and compensation for grievances inflicted by the State is a fundamental principle of the CAT, to which Indonesia is party. Therefore, the fact that over 90% of torture cases reported in Indonesia do not result in a conviction is simply
unacceptable.


In addressing this issue, the Indonesian government must first amend its existing legislative definition of torture (as mentioned previously) to acknowledge the gravity and nature of the crime, and also introduce effective and efficient mechanisms for processing, investigating and prosecuting human rights abuse cases.

This also relates to the issue of adequate victim and/or witness protection, as intimidation of victims, witnesses and their families into \n withdrawing their complaint and/or testimony accompanies many, if not all human rights abuse cases in Indonesia. The Indonesian government must take immediate measures to create a supportive and protective environment for victims of torture and other human rights-related abuses. This is a necessary step towards ensuring redress.

In the event that a torture case is taken to court, it is the fundamental right of the victim to be informed of the case verdict when and as it is decided. Under the present Indonesian Constitution, the official verdict passed by the court judge is made known only to the prosecutor and the defendant. This is in urgent need of reform.

The Truth and Reconciliation Commission Bill of 2004 is a mockery of justice, and must be abolished without further ado. That a victim must first forgive the perpetrator, and by doing so, effectively grant them prosecutory immunity before being able to claim compensation is farcical. As a member of the UN Human Rights Council, the Indonesian government is under strict obligation to address the issue of human rights violations committed under its jurisdiction, and more importantly, to take appropriate disciplinary action against State-agents found to have committed these violations. By continuing to neglect the issue of the human rights atrocities committed during the 1965-66 massacres, the Indonesian State risks losing its international credibility.



4) Indonesia’s religious minorities have long been neglected by the government. By failing to acknowledge these religious minorities, the Indonesian government is effectively actively participating in their social marginalization and vulnerability. The AHRC strongly urges President Yudoyono to immediately publicly condemn the recent and ongoing spate of attacks against members of the Ahmadiyyah minority, and bring the perpetrators of these attacks to justice.

The AHRC strongly urges the Indonesian government to acknowledge the Ahmadiyyahs and other religious minorities as legitimate religions of Indonesia, so that they too may participate in public life and civil society as equal citizens.



5) The AHRC strongly urges President Yudoyono and his government to press for an official judicial review of the recent acquittal of prime suspect Mr. Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto in the murder trial of the late Mr. Munir Said Thalib. Despite the recent uncovering of new and conclusive evidence showing a complex and carefully orchestrated political conspiracy of murder, the Attorney General and the Chief of National Police have shown no intention to conduct further investigative inquiries, which, in light of the recent findings, is the only appropriate course of action.

Therefore, the AHRC requests that further investigations be conducted into Mr. Munir’s murder in light of these recent findings. That more than one person was responsible for orchestrating Mr. Munir’s murder is evident, therefore, the refusal to comply and cooperate with official criminal investigative procedure on the part of officers of the State Intelligentsia (BIN) must not be tolerated.

In addition, the AHRC is concerned by the Indonesian government’s response to UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-Judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Mr. Philip Alston’s attempts at international intervention in the matter. Chief of National Police, General Sutanto’s statement that he would under no circumstances allow international (particularly UN) involvement in police investigations into Mr. Munir’s murder severely undermines the international credibility of the Indonesian State. It is the strong opinion of the AHRC that the international community should be included in ongoing investigations, due to the State's obvious failure to carry out an impartial investigation and prosecution in this case.


December 21, 2006